Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Williamson imagines a subject who feels cold at dawn, but gradually warms until she feels warm at noon. He notes that there seem to be three ways we might know our mental states: And this suggests that, necessarily, rational subjects are generally aware of their beliefs.
gertled Science Logic and Mathematics. Beliefs are necessarily known by the thinker because they are commitments. Jack Davis is currently reading it Oct 13, On his proposal, the special epistemic security of self-knowledge is a matter of externalist warrant: These may be clearly perceived provided we take great care in our judgments concerning them to include no more than what is strictly contained in our perception—no more than that of which we have inner awareness.
Kristin Harnoth is currently reading it Dec 20, If we restrict the relevant domain to beliefs formed by use of a method that is exclusively a method of attaining self -knowledge—perhaps introspection —we can formulate a more plausible infallibility thesis.
This omniscience thesis is sometimes expressed by saying that mental states are self-intimating or self-presenting.
No trivia or quizzes yet. Some philosophers also argue that conscious attitudes, such as judgments, have distinctive phenomenologies. Kind contends that these arguments do not directly threaten inner sense accounts. To establish this point, Burge uses the following seemingly transcendental reasoning. Epistemic Norms in Epistemology.
And anyone in a position to self-attribute a belief will possess the concept of belief, and so will grasp—or at least, manifest cognitive dispositions appropriately reflecting—these conceptual truths. Acquaintance accounts provide for highly secure beliefs that are justified by experiences rather than by other beliefs.
Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge. No rational thinker will have a conscious belief unless she regards that belief as justified—that is, unless it is subjectively justified.
Self-Knowledge – Brie Gertler – Google Books
Sf Kuan marked it as to-read Apr 03, What is relevant to the most famous philosophical argument involving self-knowledge is not these general relations but, rather, the certainty of a particular instance of belief. Centre for Studies in Civilizations. In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to knowlesge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: The central phenomenon that neo-expressivism seeks to explain is first-person authority: One would seek to specify the operational conditions under gertlrr introspection is sufficiently reliable.
Agentialists maintain that our rational agency guarantees that we are capable of—or even that we possess—self-knowledge. A knowlwdge drawback of agentialism is its limited application. Add to Cart Add to Cart. Byrne also extends the account to knowing what one thinks and what one perceives Byrne b, b. In particular, we are obligated to try to satisfy certain rational norms: The treatment is well-organized, comprehensive, fair and balanced, and I hope it might get even more students and philosophers to be intrigued by this philosophical conversation.
Self-consciousness, if the word is to be used at all, must not be described on the hallowed paraoptical model, as a torch that illuminates itself by beams of its own light reflected from a mirror in its own insides.
It knowlddge epistemically direct in that I am not aware of my mental state by being aware of something else. Self-knowledge is thought to differ from other sorts of knowledge in one or more of the know,edge ways.
Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler. Coliva argues that self-ascriptions of commitments—which for her include not only beliefs and intentions but also rationally held conative attitudes, such as desires—will always be true provided that the thinker in question is rational and has the relevant conceptsbecause these self-ascriptions will create the attitudes ascribed.
Doubts about neo-expressivism center on the question whether it truly explains knowledge of our mental states. The differences between these are subtle. Interestingly, skepticism about reflexive self-awareness was already present in James Strikingly, their disagreement about the reliability of introspection remains even after their lengthy discussion of the results. A crucial problem for the theory of introspection is to fix its range of reliability.
But self-knowledge that satisfies the bypass model is non-inferential, since the self-attribution e. The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology.
Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Published January 27th by Routledge first published January 1st Gertler goes to great lengths to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the main positions on self-knowledge.